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Abstract
Risk-averse Expected Utility (EU) decision makers with wealth-dependent utility functions may
find themselves indifferent between accepting and rejecting an indivisible risky prospect. Bell
(1988) showed that under these circumstances it is EU-enhancing for the decision maker to
engage in a pre-decision side bet, accepting the indivisible risky prospect conditional upon
winning the side bet. The side bet places the decision maker on the convex hull between the
initial-wealth utility function and the utility function with risky-prospect-augmented wealth.
We show that decision makers restricted to actuarially unfair side bets engage in a sequence
of individually EU-enhancing side bets. This occurs because optimal stake size is modest for
actuarially unfair side bets, whereby wealth remains within the interval of interim convexity
upon losing the side bet. As optimal stake size falls strongly with each successive side-bet
round, wealth remains within the interval of interim convexity. The EU enhancement conferred
by each successive round is also strongly diminishing. Hence the side-bet sequence is eventually
truncated when no further EU enhancement is available.
Keywords: Expected Utility, risk aversion, side bets, rationality, indivisibility, discreteness,
actuarial fairness
JEL classification: D81
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1 Introduction
Early in the development of modern Expected Utility (EU) theory, the descriptive value and
behavioral implications of utility-function convexity was acutely appreciated (Friedman and
Savage, 1948; Markowitz, 1952). However once the normative approach took hold in modern
EU theory, globally concave utility functions became the primary focus of investigation. It took
a further forty years before Bell (1988) showed that local convexity can emerge on an interim
basis for globally risk-averse decision makers who are in possession of a standing offer to acquire
a discrete, indivisible risky prospect. Global risk aversion notwithstanding, then, a normatively
rational EU decision maker can benefit by increasing her risk exposure through a pre-decision
side bet when within such a region of interim local convexity (Bell, 1988).1 This seemingly
counterintuitive result applies in the neighborhood of any wealth level at which a risky prospect
switches from being EU-diminishing to being EU-augmenting. Thus it holds for all EU decision
makers possessing such switch points – i.e. all but those with linear or exponential utility
functions.
We show that when a decision maker has access to actuarially unfair side bets, the optimal
side bet’s stake is smaller than in the actuarially fair case. When the decision maker loses an
optimal actuarially fair side bet, she is ejected to the lower bound of the interval of interim
convexity. However in the event of losing an actuarially unfair side bet, the decision-maker’s
wealth is diminished, but not by enough to fall out of the interval of interim convexity. Hence, a
second optimally EU-enhancing side bet may be constructed, the stake of which is smaller than
that of the first side bet, keeping the decision maker within the interval of interim convexity.
When the decision maker is indifferent between her initial certain wealth and acquiring the
indivisible risky prospect, not only will it be possible to construct a single actuarially unfair
optimal side bet, but in general a sequence of individually optimal actuarially unfair side bets
may be constructed, given continual availability of the side bets at ever-longer odds.
1Delquie´ (2008) presents two refinements: that the side bet’s value will be maximal when designed to leave the
decision maker indifferent between initial alternatives as increased by the side bet, and that it is not necessary
for the side bet to be independent of the alternatives or of background wealth.
2
2 Single side bet
We follow Bell (1988) in illustrating the singe-side-bet case with a logarithmic-utility example in
which the decision maker’s initial wealth is w0 = $10, 000. The decision maker is in possession





) for the stub price of
$5, 000. We write the prospect in net-final-wealth terms as g(g0, w0) = ($20, 000,
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; $5, 000, 1
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ln($5, 000) = ln($10, 000) = u(w0) (1)
the decision maker is indifferent between acquiring the risky prospect and sticking with her
initial (certain) wealth.






Although g1 and g0 are stochastically independent, the decision maker considers a compound,
conditional policy of only acquiring the round-zero lottery L0 if the side bet proves successful.
This compound lottery, which presumes the Reduction of Compound Lotteries (ROCL) axiom,
may be written as follows.
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Although the side bet g1 is EU-diminishing in isolation due to risk aversion, when g0 is im-
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ln($9, 000) > ln($10, 000) = u(w0) (3)
The Certainty Equivalent (CE) of this compound lottery is $10,002.2 This is a marginal ($2)
improvement, reflecting the arbitrary nature of the side bet g1. By appropriate choice of the
side bet, it will in principle be possible to improve upon this CE. Two classes of solutions are
of interest: unconstrained optimal side bets g∗1 , and counterparty-constrained optimal side bets
g∗1 |s,µ. In the former, the side-bet counterparty limits neither the maximum stake s nor the
2E[u(L1)] = u($10, 002)
3
expected return on a unit stake, i.e. the maximum mean return µ. In the latter, the side-bet
counterparty may impose a ceiling on the maximum permissible stake, and/or on the maximum
mean return µ < 0, which captures the actuarially unfair odds associated with ‘house edge’. If
the counterparty is a casino, table limits impose a ceiling on the maximum stake, and the mean
return is limited to µ = − 1
37
(European roulette) or µ = − 1
19
(American roulette).
An EU-augmenting side bet can be constructed only if the decision maker’s wealth falls
within the interval of interim convexity. The bounds of this interval also determine the payoffs
and probabilities of the optimal side bet. Figure 1 illustrates the decision-maker’s utility function
u(·) without the risky prospect and v(·) with the risky prospect. The common tangent to u(·)
and v(·) identifies the lower and upper bounds of the interval of interim convexity (w′0, w
′′
0).
The solution method for identifying these bounds analytically is presented in Appendix A. This
yields the numerical values (w′0, w
′′
0) = (9037.16, 10774.6). Given the decision-maker’s assumed
wealth in this example, an EU-augmenting side bet is possible since 10, 000 ∈ (9037.16, 10774.6),





















1) = ($20774.6, 0.277; $5774.6, 0.277; $9037.16, 0.446) (4)
and the decision maker increases her utility
E[u(L1(g(g0, w0), g
∗
1))] > E[u(L1(g(g0, w0), g1))] > u(w0) (5)
to the CE wealth level of $10, 052.8, which is clearly greater than the $10, 002 of the arbitrary
side bet g0.
We may also develop a counterparty-constrained optimal-side-bet example which recognizes
that large-scale providers of side-bet services – gaming industry firms – typically do so on an
actuarially unfair basis, or with limits (e.g. table limits) that protect consumers from themselves
and the house against doubling strategies. Here we focus on the restriction to actuarially unfair
side bets, specifically in the form of the µ = − 1
37
unit-bet expected return in European roulette.3
3A European roulette wheel has 36 numbered pockets, half red and half black, and one green pocket, which is
excluded from payout odds: a single-number bet pays out only 35:1 plus the original stake, even though the odds
4
Figure 1: Common tangent to u(·) and v(·) which determines the bounds of the interval of
interim convexity (w′0, w
′′










v(w0) = .5 ln(w0+10,000) + .5 ln(w0-5,000)
Denote the (actuarially unfair) house payout odds by a. For a single-number bet in European
roulette, the payout odds are 35:1, that is a = 35
1
. The associated win probability is p = 1+µ
1+a
,






. Meanwhile, the interim-convexity
bounds remain as above.4 To determine the optimal round-one counterparty-constrained optimal





ln(w0 + 10, 000 + sa) +
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2
ln(w0 − 5, 000 + sa)
]
+ (1− p) ln(w0 − s) (6)
by appropriate choice of stake s and payout odds a. As the win probability p is a function
against the number turning up are 36:1 ⇔ p = 1
37
.
4The round-one side bet’s bounds depend on round-zero parameters alone.
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of a and the fixed parameter µ, there are no other undetermined parameters. This is solved
by setting s = 573.33 and sa = 732.77 – i.e. smaller than in the unconstrained, actuarially
fair problem – from which follows that a = 732.77/573.33 = 1.27809 and consequently p =
(1− (1/37))/(1+1.27809) = 0.42710. Due to the house advantage µ = −1
37
, the expected value of
this side bet is |µ|s = $15.50 less than in the unconstrained problem, i.e. E[w0+psa−(1−p)s] =
$10, 000 − $15.50 = $9, 984.50.
L1(g(g0, w0), g
∗
1 |µ) = ($20732.77, 0.21355; $5732.77, 0.21355; $9, 426.67, 0.5729) (7)
With the optimal counterparty-constrained pre-decision side bet g∗1 |µ, the CE of this compound
lottery (7) becomes $10, 030.69, in which the $30.69 increase over the pre-side-bet CE is 58% of
the $52.80 increase achieved with the actuarially fair side bet g∗1 . Still, with the counterparty-
constrained optimal side bet g∗1 |µ the compound lottery L1(g(g0, w0), g
∗




1))] > E[u(L1(g(g0, w0), g
∗
1 |µ))] > E[u(L1(g(g0, w0), g1))] > u(w0)
(8)
3 Sequences of individually optimal side bets
3.1 Counterparty-unconstrained, actuarially fair case
After losing the side bet g∗1 in the round-one compound lottery L1(g(g0, w0), g
∗
1) and therefore
the $962.84 stake, the decision-maker’s wealth is reduced to w1 = w
′
0 = 9037.16. Although it
is possible to solve for the optimal round-two counterparty-unconstrained side bet,5 this side
bet is EU diminishing. Hence for the counterparty-unconstrained case, the side-bet sequence is
degenerate, being truncated at g∗1 as in Bell (1988). This degeneracy does not carry over to the
counterparty-constrained case, however.
5g∗2 = ($1, 733.17, 7.3765 × 10
−4;−$4.89, 0.9993)
6
3.2 Actuarially unfair case
When side bets are constrained to be actuarially unfair, the round-one side-bet stake is smaller
than the difference between initial wealth w0 and the lower bound of the interval of convexity w
′
0.
Hence, after losing the side bet g∗1 |µ in the round-one compound lottery L1(g(g0, w0), g
∗
1 |µ) and
therefore the associated stake s∗
1µ
= $573.33, the decision-maker’s wealth is reduced to w1 =
$9, 426.67 ∈ (w′0, w
′′
0), which is within the interval of convexity. Consequently the decision-maker
can benefit from a further side-bet round. In turn the stake of the optimal round-two side bet
s∗
2µ
= $135.25 is also smaller than w1−w
′
0. Upon losing the side bet of the round-two compound
lottery L2(g(g0, w1), g
∗





which is within the interval of convexity. Again the decision maker can benefit from a further
side-bet round. Table 1a presents this sequence of individually EU-augmenting optimal side
bets against a European-roulette counterparty. These side bets have been computed under the
assumption that the minimum stake-size increment is 0.01 (one penny). The round-four side
bet’s CE∗
4µ
is larger than w3 in the fourth decimal digit. Similarly CE
∗
5µ > w4 in the sixth
decimal digit, and CE∗6µ > w5 in the eighth decimal digit. Notice that availability of ever-
longer-odds side bets is necessary for extending the sequence, which nevertheless is truncated
to six rounds due to the discrete, one-penny stake-size increment.
Table 1a also presents the operator’s sum of expected payoffs |µ|s∗
iµ
∏i−1
j=0 qj, where qi =
(1 − pi) = 1 − ((1 + µ)/(1 + a
∗
iµ
)) is the probability that the decision maker loses her ith side
bet to the operator.6 qi−1 is the probability that the decision maker loses her i− 1 side bet, and
consequently finds herself undertaking the EU-enhancing side bet in round i. The column total
$17.89 in Table 1a is the gaming operator’s expected gross revenue from the decision maker’s
sequence of individually rational side bets.
Table 1b presents the sequence of individually EU-augmenting optimal side bets against an
American-roulette counterparty. Due to the more disadvantagous mean return (µ = −1
19
), the
round-one stake is considerably smaller than when the counterparty operates a European roulette
wheel ($358.83 rather than $573.33). After this initial stake is lost, wealth remains closer to the
original point of indifference (i.e. w0 = $10, 000). Hence, subsequent-round stakes are larger
than in the µ = −1
37
case. However, µ = −1
19
supports fewer individually utility-enhancing rounds
6We assume that the decision maker cannot fail to make it to the round-1 side-bet stage, and hence q0 = 1.
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Table 1: Parameters of optimal EU-augmenting round-i side bets.

















1 10,000.00 573.33 1.28 15.49 10,030.69 15.49
2 9,426.67 135.25 9.85 3.66 9,428.03 2.10
3 9,291.42 19.41 75.58 0.52 9,291.45 0.27
4 9,272.01 1.80 827.27 0.05 >9,272.01 0.03
5 9,270.21 0.23 6482.14 0.01 >9,270.21 0.00
6 9,269.98 0.03 49702.21 0.00 >9,269.98 0.00∑
730.05 19.73 17.89
















1 10,000.00 358.83 1.82 18.86 10,017.53 18.86
2 9,641.17 131.89 8.10 6.94 9,642.96 4.61
3 9,509.28 30.43 39.16 1.60 9,509.39 0.95
4 9,478.85 9.76 127.33 0.51 >9,478.85 0.30∑
530.91 27.94 24.72
(4 versus 6). Despite the sum of stakes being lower ($530.91 versus $730.05), the operator’s sum








is greater under the µ = −1
19
restriction than under
the µ = −1
37
restriction ($24.72 versus $17.89).
3.3 Maximally unfair case
In Section 3.2, the decision maker was allowed to choose her EU-maximizing side bet from a
degenerate menu restricted to the least-disadvantageous class of betting offered by the gaming
industry: single-number wagers on a European roulette wheel. Table 1b shows that a sequence
of individually optimal EU-enhancing side bets can be constructed when the menu is restricted
to the more disadvantageous American roulette. Here we ask, what is the most disadvantageous
per-unit-bet expected return µ
¯
that the decision maker will still find EU enhancing? The
gaming operator maximizes his per-unit-bet expected return by restricting the decision maker’s
menu of available wagers to the µ = µ
¯
singleton subset, such that at least one wager g|µ is
8
Table 2: Parameters of individually optimal EU-augmenting round-i side bets for maximally























1 10,000.00 1.11 45.338 0.21 >10,000.00 0.21
2 9,998.89 0.90 75.998 0.17 >9,998.89 0.17
3 9,997.99 0.16 564.422 0.03 >9,997.99 0.03
4 9,997.83 0.07 1146.683 0.01 >9,997.83 0.01∑
2.24 0.42 0.42
EU-enhancing E[u(L1(g(g0, w0), g|µ))] − u(w0) = ǫ > 0.
Two of the parameters determining µ
¯
may be treated as exogenous for present purposes. The
first captures the decision maker’s ‘just-noticeable difference’, operationalized as the number of
significant digits to which EU and ǫ are measured. The second captures the house minimum-
stake-size increment (here assumed to be 1 penny). Operationally we maximize |µ
¯
| subject to
(i) the discrete 1-penny minimum-stake-size increment and (ii) the requirement that the round-




> 0) at any arbitrarily fine-grained just-noticeable
difference. Table 2 presents the sequence of individually EU-enhancing side bets which follows




) = (1.11,−0.19). Even though the
house mean return is greater than in single-number bets in American or European roulette
(|µ
¯
| > |µ| > |µ|), the operator’s sum of expected gross payoffs over the four rounds amounts to
only 42 cents. In the next section, we show that the gambling operator can increase its overall
sum of expected payoffs by setting the per-unit-bet expected return to maximize the sum of
ex-ante expected house payoffs given the repeated-side-bet structure.
3.4 Maximizing gaming operator’s sum of expected payoffs
Within our interval of interest |µ| ∈ [ 1
37
, 0.19], the optimal first-round side-bet stake is mono-








But the product |µ|s∗1µ does not inherit this property. We therefore ask whether the operator’s
expected payoff on the first-round side bet |µ|s∗1µ reaches a maximum for some per-unit-bet re-
turn |µ| within the interval [ 1
37
, 0.19]. Figure 2 shows that this is indeed is the case, and that the






der the assumptions and parameters of this working example, the per-unit-bet expected return
|µ| = 1
19
= 0.053 is within one-thousandth (0.001) of the optimal expected return |µˇ| = 0.054.
Figure 2: Expected payoff to gaming operator from the first-round side bet for different values of
the |µ| parameter between |µ| = 1
37
= 0.027 and |µ
¯
| = 0.19. Maximum occurs at (0.054, 18.89).










Table 3 shows that the operator’s first-round expected payoff |µˇ|s∗1µˇ = $18.89 under the
optimal expected return |µˇ| = 0.054 is a marginal improvement over the operator’s first-round




tor’s sum of expected gross payoffs over the four individually EU-enhancing side-bet rounds is
$24.99, which compares favorably with $24.72 under |µ| = 1
19
. Thus also in terms of the gaming
operator’s expected gross revenue, the optimal-expected-return case µˇ = −0.054 dominates the
American-roulette expected return case µ = −1
19
, but only marginally. In the present setting,
American roulette’s µ = −1
19
is a good practical approximation to the optimal µˇ = −0.054.
4 Conclusion
In this note we revisit Bell’s (1988) finding that a pre-decision side bet can be a rational,
EU-enhancing strategy for determining whether to take on a large, indivisible, risky prospect.
Providers of side-bet services – gaming operators such as casinos and betting shops – do so on
an actuarially unfair basis. When pre-decision side bets are constrained to be actuarially unfair,
the side bet’s optimal stake size is biased downward. Upon losing the side bet, the decision
10
Table 3: Parameters of individually optimal EU-augmenting round-i side bets which maximize














1 10,000.00 349.80 1.855 18.89 10,016.98 18.89
2 9,650.20 130.48 8.088 7.05 9,651.98 4.71
3 9,519.72 33.57 35.652 1.81 9,519.83 1.09
4 9,486.15 9.59 128.326 0.52 >9,486.15 0.30∑
523.44 28.27 24.99
maker’s wealth consequently remains within the interval of interim convexity, instead of being
ejected to its lower boundary. Hence, the decision maker rationally engages in a further side-
bet round. Under the assumptions of Bell’s (1988) example, we find that the decision maker
rationally engages in up to four side-bet rounds (in one case, six rounds). For each successive
optimal side bet, the stake becomes smaller and the required odds become longer. This ever-
longer-odds requirement may hinder implementation of extended side-bet sequences in practice.
Nevertheless side-bet sequences are surprisingly general from a theoretical standpoint, as they
arise in all families of non-linear, non-exponential risk-averse utility functions. Together with
Bell’s (1988) seminal result, the present finding expands the range of empirical phenomena that
can be explained within the framework of normative rationality. However, it also introduces
a further set of methodological considerations that must be confronted in the design of risk-
aversion-elicitation procedures and in the empirical estimation of risk-aversion coefficients.
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A Side-bet bounds
The tangent line to u(·) at (w′0, u(w
′
0)), where u(w0) = ln(w0), is










while the tangent line to v(·) at (w′′0 , v(w
′′
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w′′0 − 5, 000
)
. (12)
In order for these lines to be the same (i.e. a common tangent to u(·) and v(·)) then they must





2(w′′0 + 10, 000)
+
1







ln(w′′0 + 10, 000) + ln(w
′′
0 − 5, 000) −
w′′0
w′′0 + 10, 000
−
w′′0
w′′0 − 5, 000
)
. (14)
Solving these two equations computationally yields (w′0, w
′′
0) = (9037.16, 10774.6).
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